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Does Corporate Governance Matter in Fund Management Company: the case 
of China 
 
Emmanuel Mamatzakisa and Bingrun Xub 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates the effectiveness of the contractual governance of Chinese 
fund management companies by using comprehensive governance data over the 
period from 2005 to 2015. The study finds that board size a negative impact on its 
performance and market share. The findings are consistent with the ‘agency cost’ 
hypothesis. This paper also finds a positive association between the percentage of 
independent directors and market share and a negative correlation between the 
percentage of independent directors and the expense ratio. Moreover, a fund 
management company with a higher level of managerial ownership and a higher 
proportion of institutional investors results in more effective fund governance; 
however, a larger institutional investor holding may lead to a higher expense ratio.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
It is mandatory for each mutual fund to have its own board of directors and they are 
required to register as a corporation (an independent legal entity) in the United 
States. As shareholders, fund investors claim their proportionate interests on the 
fund total net asset value. The corporate governance structure in the U.S. mutual 
fund industry was created by the Investment Company of 1940, supplemented with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. Mutual fund governance 
provides for a board of directors to be instituted which is elected from shareholders. 
By protecting shareholders’ interests, the board of directors are encouraged to 
supervise the performance of the fund for the overall benefit of fund investors. There 
have been several papers which have shown that corporate governance plays a key 
role in protecting the interests of fund investors (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Del et al, 
2003; Ferris and Yan, 2009; Adams et al, 2010; Fu and Wedge, 2011 and 
Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016). The structure of U.S. mutual fund 
governance is presented in Figure 1. As shown in this diagram, the board has a 
significant influence on the management team through the selection of financial 
advisors (fund managers) and setting management fees.  
 
China has a different type of mutual fund governance structure, known as 
contractual mutual fund governance. Gong et al (2016) claim that a contractual 
mutual fund can be regarded as a product or services provided to fund investors by a 
fund management company, as opposed to providing equity shares which is the 
case for a corporate mutual fund in the U.S. The organizational structure of a 
contractual mutual fund is presented in Figure 2. This shows that fund investors are 
only fund unit holders, as they enter into a legal sales contract with a fund 
management company whereby they acquire the right to participate in a certain 
asset pool. The shareholders of the fund companies could be an insurance 
company, a commercial bank or other kinds of financial institutions. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of direct representation for fund investors in fund company 
governance. Without the voice of investors being represented in the governance of a 
fund management company and a weak institutional environment, effective 
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corporate governance becomes vital for protecting the interests of fund investors. If 
the governance mechanism is ineffective, redemption of their shares will be the only 
recourse for fund investors.  
 
This raises the question of whether fund investors’ interests are protected under 
contractual mutual fund governance. A good governance structure will effectively 
promote fund investors’ interests. Those interestsc  include a fund management 
company’s expense ratio and performance, as those factors are at the top of the list 
of investor interests. In addition, this paper adopts the market share of a fund 
management company as a third factor. This factor may reflect whether fund 
investors have preferences for a particular governance structure. Hence, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine governance effectiveness, which is reflected by a 
fund management company’s expense ratio, performance and market share under 
contractual governance. The first measure of governance effectiveness is whether a 
certain type of governance structure is related to the expense ratio. All else being 
equal, fund investors will choose funds with a lower expense ratio. Del et al (2003) 
indicate that boards with a higher percentage of independent directors have a 
negative impact on the expense ratio. The second measure of governance 
effectiveness is whether a fund management company’s performance is correlated 
with board structure. This link is indirect; thus, if the board can exercise better 
monitoring of the management and recognize skilled fund managers, the managers 
will work more diligently and reduce misbehaviour. Finally, the third measure of 
governance effectiveness is a fund management company’s market share. Khorana 
and Servaes (2012) claim that market share represents the culmination of all the 
decisions made by fund families and the investors’ response to those decisions. 
Hence, market share may reveal investors’ preference for a certain type of 
governance structure.  
 
This paper differs from previous studies on mutual fund governance in the following 
ways. Firstly, this is the first paper to investigate whether contractual mutual fund 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
c Kong and Tang (2008) employ fund fees, performance and flows as fund shareholders’ interests. 
  Guercio et al (2003) use expense ratios as fund shareholders’ interests.	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governance has an important impact on governance effectiveness.  This will help 
investors to understand how their interests can be protected by a certain type of 
governance structure. And also, it will be vital for academics and policy makers to 
recognize the potential determinants of mutual funds governance effectiveness. 
Secondly, this paper will help investors to recognize which strategies have been 
pursued by a fund management company and reflect the responses of investors to 
these strategies by examining the effect on a fund management company’s market 
share.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews studies on corporate 
governance of mutual fund management companies and also discusses the 
development of the hypotheses. Chapter 3 explains the methodology and data used. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the empirical study and offers some discussion. 
The final chapter summarizes key findings and suggests policy implications.  
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Fig.1 The figure shows the governance structure of a corporate mutual fund in the U.S.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 The figure illustrates the governance structure of contractual mutual fund governance in China 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Background to mutual fund industry 
The early fund literature focuses particularly on the fund level and various aspects of 
mutual fund performance (see, e.g. Golec, 1996; Wermers, 2000; Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2002; Cuthberson et al, 2008, Fama and French, 2010; Cuthberson et 
al, 2012). In recent years, research at the level of the fund family has begun to obtain 
greater prominence. The growing literature on fund families includes that by 
Mamaysky and Spiegel (2002), which suggests that new funds should be created 
which allow investors to take advantage of the firm’s research in new ways at the 
fund family level. Offering a new fund which differs from existing funds may appeal to 
new investors. However, Massa (2003) finds a robust and statistically significant 
negative association between the degree of product differentiation and fund 
performance. 
 
Nanda et al (2004) indicate that there is a strong positive spillover effect from having 
a star performer in the fund family and implies that star performance contributes to 
bringing larger cash inflow into the fund and to other funds within the family. Kempf 
and Ruenzi (2008a) agree that reaching a top position within the fund family results 
in large inflows of cash. Furthermore, they also find that this consequence is much 
stronger in large families than in small families. This conclusion is also supported by 
Jank and Wedow (2013), as they claim that new cash inflows pursuits the top 
performers within the family and discover that intra family rankings play a significant 
part in investor redemption. 
 
However, these studies focus on the impact of past mutual fund performance and 
product differentiation, rather than governance. The existence of academic studies 
on mutual fund governance highlights the significance of this topic to both academics 
and capital markets.  
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2.2 Board size 
According to Agency theory, a larger board acts less efficiently than a smaller board 
because of a rise in agency conflicts which might be contributed to by inefficient 
communication and cooperation costs. On the other hand, board size is positively 
related with larger firms’ performance, as larger firms might place greater demands 
on a larger board which can legitimately orient the company to its external 
environment (Pfeffer, 1972). With respect to the literature on mutual fund board size, 
Tufano and Sevick (1997) claim that smaller fund boards size are associated with 
lower shareholder fees. Del et al (2003) confirm this result by analyzing in closed-
end investment companies. Kong and Tang (2008) adopt a unique governance 
structure known as the unitary board (one board). They conclude that unitary boards 
of small size may tend to have lower fees. Additionally, Adams et al (2010) find that 
board size is negatively related to overall performance by using manually-collected 
data on boards of directors, consisting of 976 funds and derived from yearly 
observations taken from 1998 to 2007 in the U.S. market.  
 
Furthermore, Liu (2009) documents that board size is negatively correlated with firm 
performance and explains that the communication issue could be the main factor 
resulting in a negative impact by examining 1196 listed companies in China. By the 
contrast, Chen (2015) finds that listed firms with larger boards and more outsider 
directors have superior performance in China. Based on these arguments and the 
preferences of investors, it is reasonable to predict that an increase in the board size 
has a negative effect on governance effectiveness. Therefore, the hypotheses can 
be defined as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: an increase in the board size could have a positive influence on the 
fund management company’s expense ratio 
Hypothesis 1b: an increase in the board size could have a negative influence on the 
fund management company’s performance 
Hypothesis 1c: an increase in the board size could have a negative influence on the 
fund management company’s market share 
	   8	  
2.3 Board structure 
Previous studies of corporate governance have recognized the importance of board 
structure. For instance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that firms with more 
independent directors have a positive influence on performance. Dalton et al (1998) 
also claim that firms with independent boards can diminish the managerial and 
operational risks. Tufano and Sevick (1997) study the composition of boards of 
directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds. They find that funds with a greater 
proportion of independent directors tend to have lower shareholder fees.  
 
Furthermore, Ding and Wermers (2005) and Khorana et al (2007) show that there is 
a positive relationship between board independence and a decision to replace 
underperforming fund managers or merge one underperforming fund with another 
underperforming fund. According to these studies, more independent directors in a 
board are normally more beneficial to shareholders. However, by contrast, the 
results of Ferris and Yan’s (2007) study show that overall fund performance and the 
probability of a fund scandal are not correlated with either chair or board 
independence. More recently, Fu and Wedge (2011) claimed that the likelihood of 
fund managers with poor past performance being replaced increases with a greater 
percentage of independent directors on the board.  Kryzanowski and 
Mohebshahedin (2016) further find that funds with a higher percentage of 
independent directors were associated with lower expense ratios in the closed-end 
funds market in the years from 1994 to 2013.  
 
However, there has been little attempt to analyse the issue of independent boards in 
the Chinese mutual fund industry. Most studies in the literature focus on public 
companies. For instance, Jiang (2007) finds that having a higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board has a positive impact on Chinese listed 
companies. This finding is supported by Zhao and Zeng (2008) and Shan and McIver 
(2011). Recently, Wang (2014) reviews 30 empirical studies about the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance and concludes that independent 
directors may play an advisory role but not a monitoring role in Chinese listed firms. 
Moreover, Liu et al (2015) offer the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the 
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relationship between board independence and firm performance in China and 
discover that independent directors have an overall positive effect on firm operating 
performance by adopting instrumental variables, GMM estimator and the difference 
in differences method. Although these empirical studies illustrate the impact of board 
structure on the fund level and in public companies, it is possible to predict that a 
fund management company with a higher percentage of independent directors on 
the board is more effective.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: a fund management company with a greater percentage of 
independent directors will lead to a decrease in the fund management company’s 
expense ratio 
Hypothesis 2b: a fund management company with a greater percentage of 
independent directors will lead to an increase in the fund management company’s 
performance  
Hypothesis 2c: a fund management company with a greater percentage of 
independent directors will lead to an increase in the fund management company’s 
market share 
 
2.4 Managerial ownership 
Based on corporate governance studies, in general, the interest of a manager is in 
alignment with shareholders if the manager has partial ownership of the company 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Murphy, 1999).  In support of this conclusion, 
Khorana et al (2007) find that managerial (fund managers’) ownership has desirable 
incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors according to their mutual 
fund studies. In addition, it is not only fund manager ownership which has a positive 
impact on fund performance, but also board ownership. Chen et al (2008) find that 
there is a greater proportion of directors who hold shares in the funds they oversee, 
and indicate that board ownership is positively and significantly correlated with 
benefits to shareholders.  Cremers et al (2009) also suggest that mutual funds with 
lower levels of director ownership significantly underperform funds with higher levels 
of director ownership at both the fund family and the individual fund levels, as the 
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interests of the directors are more in line with shareholder interests.  Furthermore, 
Fricke (2015) claims that fund boards with lower director holding have a lower 
likelihood to replace underperforming fund managers, based on 2003 data from 606 
mutual funds. This helps to explain why some fund managers might consistently 
underperform their peers over a long time. According to studies on Chinese public 
companies, Wei et al (2005) and Yuan et al (2008) claim that managerial ownership 
has a positive impact on firm performance which is consistent with the “convergence 
of interest” hypothesis. Based on these arguments, funds with higher levels of board 
ownership will become more aligned with shareholders’ interests. Therefore, it is 
possible to hypothesise that an increase in managerial ownership will have a positive 
impact on governance effectiveness.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: an increase in managerial ownership could have a negative impact 
on the fund management company’s expense ratio 
Hypothesis 3b: an increase in managerial ownership could have a positive impact on 
the fund management company’s performance  
Hypothesis 3c: an increase in managerial ownership could have a positive impact on 
the fund management company’s market share 
 
2.5 Institutional investors 
In theory, fund investors can always redeem their shares at net asset value if they 
dislike the way the fund is operating. Fama and Jensen (1993) claim that this market 
governance reduces the need for other forms of governance in mutual funds. 
Generally, institutional investors are assumed to be better informed than individual 
investors. James and Karceski (2006) indicate that funds with a higher institutional 
holding perform better than other forms of funds, both before and after adjusting for 
risk and expenses. Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) also find that the fund-flow of 
sophisticated institutional investors is more sensitive to fund expenses and risk–
adjusted performance than that of retail investors. Recently, Gong et al (2016) took 
the role of investor composition as a measure of external governance and find that 
more institutional investment in a fund contributes to improving the fund performance 
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in the case of the Chinese equity mutual fund market. According to this empirical 
evidence, institutional investors are more sophisticated and resourceful than retail 
investors in the way of monitoring the operation of management team. Therefore, the 
paper hypothesizes that an increase in the institutional investors’ holding in a fund 
management company will have a positive impact on its governance effectiveness.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: an increase in the institutional investors’ holding in a fund 
management company will have a negative impact on its expense ratio 
Hypothesis 4b: an increase in the institutional investors’ holding in a fund 
management company will have a positive impact on its performance 
Hypothesis 4c: an increase in the institutional investors’ holding in a fund 
management company will have a positive impact on its market share 
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Chapter 3: Data and methodology 
 
The main source of mutual fund data is the China Securities Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database (also known as the Guo Tai An (GTA) database). This 
database has been widely used in prior studies (Zhang and Ding, 2006; Yuan et al, 
2008; Ding et al, 2010; Feng and Johansson, 2015 and Jiong et al, 2016). The 
CSMAR database is a leading global provider of Chinese data and provides seven 
major database series, including: stock market; corporate, bonds; funds; industry; 
and economy. Information is available both at the fund management company level 
and at the individual fund level. The sample period is from 2005 to 2015 and includes 
funds in all investment objectives. The year 2005 has been chosen as the 
commencement year in this paper because open–end funds only started in 2001, 
and there is a lack of comprehensive data before 2005. In addition, the CSMAR 
database describes several classifications of investment objectives for each fund.  
 
Furthermore, a number of mutual funds have several share classes, especially in the 
case of money market mutual funds and bond market mutual funds, and the CSMAR 
database separates each share class as an individual fund. However, these 
individual funds represent claims on the identical underlying assets, and have the 
same returns before expenses and loads. The only difference lies in their fee 
structure or in their clientele. In this paper, we aggregate these multiple share 
chasses into one fund. The fund characteristics are calculated based on the TNA–
weighted average.  
 
Research design 
 
This paper opts for a fixed effect estimation and the two-step ‘system’ generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) estimation to examine governance effectiveness. The 
fixed effect analysis can control for omitted heterogeneous fund management 
company–specific effects. Hence, the general model for measuring the relationship 
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between fund governance and governance effectiveness can be expressed as 
follows: 𝐺𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠!,! =   𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙!,! + 𝜀!,!                                              (1) 
 
where 𝐺𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠!,!  is the dependent variable and is reflected by a fund 
management company’s expense ratio, performance and market share; 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! is board size, board structure, managerial ownership and 
institutional investors’ holding; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙!,! represents the control variables including 
the fund management company’s size, number of funds, number of funds started 
and the company’s focus, while 𝜀!,! denotes the error term. 
 
Furthermore, by taking into account endogeneity issuesd, this paper follows the study 
by Khorana and Servaes (2012) and adopts the two-step system GMM estimators 
(Arrelano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998) with bias–corrected robust 
standard errors, which was introduced by Windmeijer (2005). This model includes 
one lag of governance effectiveness as an independent variable. The results of the 
two–step system GMM estimator are tested via Hansen’s diagnostic test for 
instrument validity, and by Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test for second–order 
autocorrelation of the error terms. 
The dynamic panel model takes the following form: 
 
 𝐺𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠!,! =  𝛼! +   𝛽!𝐺𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙!,! + 𝜀!,!                                                                                                                                              
(2) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  d	  This	  paper	  employs	  Roodman	  (2009)	  “Xtabond2”	  specification	  in	  Stata.	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Governance variables 
 
In this section, the paper provides a discussion of the governance characteristics 
used in the analysis of a fund management company’s governance effectiveness. 
The governance variables include board structure, board size, managerial ownership 
and institutional investors’ holding. The board structure is represented by the 
percentage of independent directors on the board of the fund management 
company. Independent directors are less likely to be in conflict with shareholder 
interests, as they are not employed by the investment advisors. Therefore, 
independent directors should have more incentive to monitor the operation of fund 
management team. The board size is the number of directors on the board of the 
fund management company. Managerial ownership is the ownership percentage of 
board directors and fund managers in a fund management company. In addition, the 
institutional investors’ holding is the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors in a fund management company.  
 
Governance effectiveness 
 
This paper adopts three different variables to measure governance effectiveness. 
The first measure of governance effectiveness is the fund management company’s 
expense ratio. Each fund expense ratio is computed by dividing fund expenses by a 
fund’s total assets. Fund expenses include management, administrative, operating 
and advertising costs. However, sales charges are not included in the expense ratio. 
The fund management company’s expense ratio is calculated by the weighted 
average of expense ratios across all funds within the fund management company. 
Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del et al (2003) indicate that boards with a higher 
percentage of independent directors have a negative impact on the expense ratio.  
 
The second measure of governance effectiveness is the fund management 
company’s performance. This paper employs two different measurements of a 
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company’s performance. The first method is the fund management company’s raw 
return which is calculated by the weighted average of raw returns across all funds 
within the fund management company. The second method is the abnormal return 
which is the difference between the fund management company’s  raw return and its 
market returne. Finally, the third measure of governance effectiveness is the fund 
management company’s market share. Market share is calculated by adding 
together all the assets managed by each company and then dividing this figure by 
the total managed assets in the fund industry. Khorana and Servaes (2012) claim 
that market share represents the culmination of all the decisions made by fund 
families and the investors’ response to those decisions. Hence, the market share 
may reveal fund investors’ preference for certain types of governance structure.  
 
Control variables 
 
In addition to the governance variables described in the previous section, this paper 
also includes a number of control variables which might have an impact on 
governance effectiveness. The following discussion provides a brief description of 
these control variables. Fund management company size is the log of total net 
assets managed by the fund company. This variable is used to control for possible 
economies of scale in the mutual fund industry. Family focus is defined as the 
Herfindahl index of fund level within the family. It is computed as the sum of the 
squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund. More focused fund 
management companies are easier and less costly to monitor, as their investment 
strategies are less diverse. Siggekow (2003) claims that funds with more focused 
fund management companies are more likely to obtain higher returns. Hence, more 
focused fund management companies may be more likely to attain a higher market 
share via excellent performance. However, Khorana and Servaes (2012) did not 
observe a significant relationship between market share and family focus in their 
research on U.S. mutual funds. Number of objectives per fund management 
company is the total number of objectives that a fund management company has in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  e	  The	  market	  return	  is	  calculated	  by	  40%	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Composite	  index,	  40%	  of	  the	  Shenzhen	  Composite	  Index	  and	  20%	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Government	  bond	  index	  (Zeng	  et	  al,	  2006;	  Jin	  and	  Wu,	  2007).	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a given year. Number of funds per fund management company is the total number of 
funds in a specific fund management company in a given year. Number of funds 
started is the total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a 
given year.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the sample. Panel A indicates that the 
fund management companies have 8.68 directors on average, which is similar to the 
figure of 8.58 obtained by Fu and Wedge (2011) and 9.24 by Kong and Tang (2008). 
The average number of independent directors is 3.32, which is much less than Kong 
and Tang’s (2008) average of 7.2 in their sample for the U.S. The average 
percentage of independent directors is 38.72% which is also less than that of 78% 
obtained by Kong and Tang (2008). The average value of managerial ownership for 
directors is only 0.07%, while the supervisory board size is 3.68 on average. Panel B 
shows that institutional investors hold 69.13% of total assets in fund management 
companies on average, which indicates that the majority of fund investors in China 
are institutional investors. However, Gong et al (2016) find that institutional investors 
only hold 23.18% of shares in equity mutual funds in China, on average. Panel C 
reveals that the average fund management company expense ratio is 1.87%. The 
average fund performance measured by the objective–adjusted return is -4.95%, 
which implies that the fund management companies performed worse than the 
market on average during the sample period. The average market share of a fund 
management company is 1.46%, which is greater than that of 0.36% obtained by 
Khorana and Servaes (2012) for their U.S. sample. Concerning the fund 
management company specific variables shown in Panel D, during the sample 
period, the average size of a fund management company is 36 billion Chinese Yuan. 
The average number of new funds started is 3.34. Meanwhile, the average number 
of funds per fund management company is 12.2 and the average number of 
objectives per fund management company is 5.77. Finally, the Herfindahl index 
across funds is 3990.12 on average. 
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<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Table 2 shows summary statistics on the evolution of the family market share during 
the sample period from 2005 to 2015. According to these statistics, there was an 
increase in the number of families competing in the industry from 47 in 2005 to 101 
families in 2015, with the rise being especially noticeable after the financial crisis 
from 2008 to 2010. Over the same period, the average market share of a family 
decreased from 1.55% to 1.06%. This implies that the mutual fund market became 
more fragmented over the sample period. Interestingly, the market share of the three 
largest families declined significantly from 2005 to 2006. However, the market share 
of the three largest families remained relatively constant at approximately 20% - 23% 
since 2006. Finally, the market share of the five largest families appeared to 
decrease slightly from 35.95% in 2006 to 31.66% in 2015.  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Multicollinearity  
 
Table 3 displays all the correlation coefficients of the independent variables. The 
results show that almost all of the correlation coefficients are below the value of 0.4. 
This means that the independent variables in the regression are not highly 
correlated. However, it is noteworthy that there is a high positive correlation between 
the number of funds and the number of funds started. Therefore, those two variables 
are not in the same regression.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
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Chapter 4: Empirical results 
 
This section provides the empirical results regarding whether the unique governance 
structure of China’s mutual funds industry protects fund investors’ interests after 
controlling for various fund management company characteristics, for instance, fund 
management company focus, size and number of funds started.  
 
Board size–governance effectiveness relationship 
 
Tables 4 to 6 present the regression results for the relationship between board size 
and corporate governance effectiveness using different proxies for fund 
management company governance effectiveness. This paper finds that board size 
has a positive impact on a fund management company’s expense ratio (Table 4, 
Model 1 and 2), but it is statistically insignificant. This positive coefficient may 
support the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
suggesting that a larger board could lead to higher information asymmetry and 
communication and cooperation costs. However, this result differs from previous 
empirical studies by Tufano and Sevick (1997), Del et al (2003), Cremers et al 
(2009), Adams et al (2009) and Liu (2009), as they find a statistically significant 
relationship between expense ratios and board size. 
 
For the measure of raw return, the board size is positively related to raw return at the 
10% significance level (Table 5, model 1). This finding is contrary to Jensen’s (1983) 
conclusion that a larger board acts less efficiently than a smaller board because of a 
rise in agency conflicts. Thus, a larger board size could hamper the fund 
management company’s performance. When performance is adjusted by market 
return, board size is negatively and insignificantly related to the fund management 
company’s performance. Therefore, this finding does not support the negative 
correlation between board size and performance reported by Liu (2009), Adams et al 
(2010) and Yu et al (2015). 
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Furthermore, Table 6 reports that the board size is negatively correlated with the 
market share according to different fund management company performance 
measures. The result remains at the 5% level of significance (Table 6, Model 1 and 
2). An increase in board size would lead to a decrease in a fund management 
company’s market share. This implies that when the board size increases by one 
unit, the market share of a fund management company would decrease by 
approximately 0.12%. According to the literature, no previous research has been 
conducted into the impact of board size on the market share of fund management 
companies in the mutual funds industry. In the literature on public companies, Allen 
and Gale (2000) point out that those companies in Japan with a large board size are 
associated with higher quality, cheaper prices and better designs, all of which would 
increase their market share. Overall, the results support the Hypothesis H1c which 
states that an increase in the number of board directors could reduce the market 
share of a fund management company.  
 
Board structure-governance effectiveness relationship 
 
Regarding board structure, the percentage of independent directors on a board 
asserts a negative impact on the fund management company’s expense ratio at the 
10% significance level (Table 4, Model 3 and 4). This means that a fund 
management company with a higher percentage of independent directors will charge 
lower fees. An increase of one unit in the percentage of independent directors is 
associated with a decline of approximately 0.02% in the fund management 
company’s expense ratio. This result is consistent with Tufano and Sevick (1997), 
Del et al (2003) and Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin’s (2016) studies, as they all 
document a negative relationship between fund expense ratio and the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. Therefore, more independent boards are 
desirable from a fund investor’s perspective.  
 
Table 5 shows that, when return or abnormal return approaches are used, the 
percentage of independent directors is not statistically significant. This result is 
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consistent with that of Ferris and Yanf (2007), as they find no evidence that board 
independence is significantly related to fund performance. Their findings are robust 
to an instrumental variable approach. In addition, Yu et al (2015) also support this 
argument as they reveal that board independence has no effect on a fund 
management company’s performance in China. However, by contrast, Ding and 
Wermers (2005), Khorana et al (2007), Jiang (2007) and Fu and Wedge (2011) find 
that boards with a higher percentage of independent directors are associated with a 
better fund performance. Furthermore, this finding is also not in line with the 
evidences from China listed firms empirical studies, as Zhao and Zeng (2008), Shan 
and McIver (2011) and Liu et al (2015) claim that independent boards are effective at 
curbing agency problems leading to better performance. One possible explanation 
for this relationship is the shortage of qualified independent directors in China, which 
means that it is difficult for independent directors to monitor the behaviour of the 
management team effectively (Yu et al, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, regarding the market share, the percentage of independent directors 
has a positive impact on the fund management company’s market share at the 10% 
significance level (Table 6, Model 3 and 4). This implies that an increase in the 
percentage of independent directors may improve the level of the fund management 
company’s market share. This may not support Kong and Tang’s (2008) argument 
that neither an independent chair nor a majority of independent directors is rewarded 
by more fund flows. Therefore, according to these findings, Hypotheses H2 a and c 
are supported. 
 
Managerial ownership–governance effectiveness relationship 
 
In terms of the effect of managerial ownership, it can be seen from Table 4 that 
ownership has a positive impact on expense ratio, but it is statistically insignificant 
(Table 4, Model 5 and 6). This finding is contrary to that of Meschke (2006) and 
Cremers et al (2009) as they reveal that non-independent director ownership is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  f	  They	  only	  use	  one	  year’s	  worth	  of	  data	  for	  analysis.	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negatively and statistically correlated with expense ratio. In addition, board 
ownership asserts a positive impact on fund management company performance at 
the 10% significance level (Table 5, Model 7). This finding is consistent with earlier 
studies (Khorana et al 2007; Chen et al, 2008; Evans, 2008; Cremers et al, 2009 and 
Fricke, 2015), suggesting that fund management companies with a higher level of 
board or fund manager ownership perform better than fund management companies 
with lower board ownership. Moreover, this finding is also consistent with the 
“convergence of interest” hypothesis, indicating that as the proportion of managerial 
equity ownership increases, managers should have more incentive to maximise the 
firm value. Hence, this result reflects the fact that managerial interest aligns with fund 
shareholder interest.  
 
Furthermore, as would be expected, managerial ownership also has a positive 
impact on the market share of a fund management company. The results are robust 
at the 5% level of significance (Table 6, Model 5 and 6). The estimated value of the 
coefficients imply that if there is a one per cent increase in board ownership, the 
market share of a fund management company may grow by 0.36 or 0.37 basis points 
respectively, according to Model 5 and 6. This result is in contrast to an earlier 
empirical study by Kong and Tang (2008)g. Finally, it is interesting to note that these 
results are in line with Hypotheses 3 b and c as they show that an increase in 
managerial ownership will have a positive impact on a firm’s performance and 
market share respectively.  
 
External governance–governance effectiveness relationship 
 
Concerning the impact of external governance (institutional investors’ holding) on 
governance effectiveness, Table 4 shows a strong positive impact of institutional 
investors’ holding on the expense ratio in Model 7 and 8. The outcomes remain 
robust at the 1% level of significance (Table 4, Model 7 and 8) but small in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  g	  They	   employ	   director	   incentive	   rather	   than	   board	   ownership,	   as	   director	   incentive	   is	   defined	   as	   the	  percentage	   of	   independent	   directors	  whose	   investments	   in	   the	   fund	   family	   are	   greater	   than	   their	   total	  compensation	  from	  the	  fund	  family;	  whichever	  is	  smaller.	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magnitude. This finding implies that a one unit increase in the institutional investors’ 
holding slightly improves a fund management company’s expense ratio by 1.33 or 
1.31 basis points. However, Evan and Fahlenbrach (2012) claim an opposite view 
that institutional investors are more sensitive to high fees and poor performance than 
retail investors. Besides, institutional investors’ holding also asserts a positive and 
significant influence on performance with regard to the abnormal return approach. 
The result is robust at the 5% level of significance (Table 5, Model 8). This finding is 
consistent with the study by Evan and Fahlenbrach (2012) and Gong et al (2016), 
which indicates that fund management companies with a larger institutional investor 
holding may outperform fund management companies with a smaller institutional 
investor holding. This is due to the possible stronger monitoring power of large fund 
holders.  
 
Turning now to the fund management company’s market share, the results show that 
the institutional investors’ holding has a positive impact on the market share of a 
fund management company, but it is statistically insignificant. Overall, fund 
management companies with higher institutional investors holding will result in 
charging higher fees and performing superior performance due to better 
management skills, more research resources and greater monitoring efforts. 
Therefore, these findings support Hypothesis 4b in showing that an increase in the 
institutional investor holding in a fund management company will have a positive 
impact on its performance. 
 
<Insert Tables 4 to 6 about here> 
 
Endogeneity issues 
 
Furthermore, endogeneity may be a concern in relation to the overall connection 
between corporate governance and governance effectiveness. Earlier analyses of 
this paper only address the potential issues of serial correlation and 
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heteroscedasticity in data. Analyses in Tables 7, 8 and 9 address endogeneity issue 
by employing the dynamic panel analysis (the two–step ‘system’ GMM). Moreover, 
regarding the basic diagnostics, the tests (AR(2)) for second order autocorrelation in 
second differences and the Hansen J–statistics of over–identifying restrictions are 
insignificant in all the corresponding models (see Tables 7, 8 and 9). The instrument 
variables will be the lag of each independent variable. 
 
With regards to the board size illustrated in Table 7, the paper finds a consistent 
result with previous one in Table 4, indicating that board size has no impact on 
expense ratio. Table 8 reveals that board size has a positive impact on the raw 
return. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. By contrast, the 
relationship is negative in the case of the abnormal return. The result remains robust 
at the 1% level of significance (Table 8, Model 5). In this regard, the finding supports 
that of Jensen (1993) in relation to the extent of the abnormal return. In addition, this 
negative relation is consistent with earlier studies by Adams et al (2009), Liu (2009) 
and Yu et al (2015), suggesting that board size affects a fund management company 
negatively, and that a small board size is more effective in enhancing a fund 
management company’s performance. Moreover, board size is reported to have a 
negative impact on market share (Table 9, Model 1 and 2), but the effect is 
insignificant. This finding is not consistent with the finding from the fixed effect 
model.  
 
Table 7 shows that the fund management company’s expense ratios are positively 
related to the board structure. The parameters estimated are not statistically 
significant in Model 3 and 4. This finding is not consistent with the previous finding 
from the fixed effect model, suggesting that higher percentages of independent 
directors are associated with lower expense ratios (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Del et 
al, 2003 and Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin, 2016). However, this result supports 
Ferris and Yan’s (2007) contention that board structure is not significantly related to 
a fund management company’s expense ratio.   
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Table 8 reports that raw return is positively correlated with board structure in Model 
2, but the effect is not statistically significant.  When performance is adjusted by 
market return, board structure asserts a negative impact on a fund management 
company’s performance, but the effect is also insignificant. The results imply that the 
percentage of independent directors is not correlated with performance.  This finding 
is in line with that of Ferris and Yan (2007) and Yu et al (2015). Turning now to the 
fund management company’s market share, Table 9 shows that board structure has 
a strong positive influence on a fund management company’s market share at the 
1% (Table 9, Model 3) and 5% (Table 9, Model 4) level of significance. The results 
imply that having a greater percentage of independent directors is associated with a 
higher level of market share. In other words, increasing the percentage of 
independent directors is an effective way of obtaining a larger market shareh. This 
finding is not consistent with that of Kong and Tang (2008), as they state that board 
structure is irrelevant to fund flows, as well as market share.  
 
With regard to the managerial ownership of a fund management company, there is 
weak evidence that fund management companies with a high level of board 
ownership have lower expense ratios. This result is robust at the 10% level of 
significance (Table 7, Model 6). By replacing abnormal return with raw return (Model 
5), the effect becomes no longer statistically significant. The impact of managerial 
ownership on expense ratio is not in line with the findings reported in the fixed effect 
model (Table 4, Model 5 and 6). Nevertheless, Chen et al (2008) and Cremers et al 
(2009) support this negative relationship between managerial ownership and a fund 
management company’s expense ratios. One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that directors’ investments in the fund management company are 
greater than their total compensation from the fund management company. 
However, there is insufficient data to examine this hypothesis, as fund management 
companies are not required to disclose their total compensation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
h Khorana and Servaes (2012) claim that price competition and product differentiation are both 
effective ways of obtaining market share. 
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According to Table 8, in the measure of raw return (Model 3), managerial ownership 
is negatively related with a fund management company’s performance. When 
performance is measured by abnormal return, managerial ownership has a positive 
impact on performance at the 1% level of significance (Table 8, Model 7). This result 
is consistent with previous studies by Chen et al (2008), Evans (2008), Cremers et al 
(2009) and Fricke (2015), suggesting that fund management companies with higher 
levels of board or fund manager ownership perform better than fund management 
companies with lower board ownership. Moreover, Table 9 reports that managerial 
ownership has a positive impact on the market share of a fund management 
company. This result remains robust at the 5% level of significance (Model 5). 
Economically, an increase of one unit in board ownership will tend to improve a fund 
management company’s market share by 1.8 per cent. However, in Model 6, this 
positive relationship is insignificant.  
 
Concerning the impact of the relationship between external governance and 
institutional investors’ holding in the fund management company on its expense 
ratios, Table 7 reveals that there is a positive relationship between the institutional 
investors’ holding and the expense ratio. The estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5% (Table 7, Model 7) and 1% (Table 7, Model 8) level. The results 
remain robust to the findings in the fixed effect model (Table 4, Model 7 and 8) and 
imply that a one unit increase in the institutional investors’ holding improves the 
expense ratios by 1 and 2 basis points, respectively.  
 
In addition, Table 8 displays the impact of the institutional investors’ holding on 
performance, depending on the different kinds of performance measurement. The 
table shows that the institutional investors’ holding has a negative impact on the raw 
return at the 1% level of significance (Table 8, Model 4), while it has a positive 
impact on the abnormal return at the 1% level of significance (Table 8, Model 8). 
This positive relation is consistent with the findings from the previous fixed effect 
models (Table 5, Model 4 and 8). Additionally, this result supports the earlier studies 
by James and Karceski (2006), Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) and Gong et al 
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(2016), indicating that funds with a higher institutional holding perform better than 
funds with a lower level of institutional holding.  
 
Next, it is interesting to note that a positive relationship exists between the 
institutional holding and the fund management company’s market share. The 
parameters estimated are statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 9, Model 7 
and 8), depending on the different kinds of performance measurement adopted. An 
increase in monitory power, which is reflected by an improvement in the level of 
institutional investor holding, would result in an increase in market share. This result 
might be explained by the smart money hypothesis which is proposed by Gruber 
(1996). He claims that if investors are able to identify superior management, they will 
channel their money into those funds. Overall, the paper finds that an increase in the 
institutional investors’ holding would lead to an increase in the expense ratio, 
performance and market share of the fund management company.  
 
<Insert Tables 7 to 9 about here> 
 
Shareholder structure – governance effectiveness relationship 
 
Furthermore, according to the Shanghai Stock Exchange (2004) claims that 70% of 
the independent directors are nominated by top shareholders of the firms. Therefore, 
it is meaningful to examine whether the shareholder structure of the fund 
management company has an impact on governance effectiveness. This paper 
adopts the Top1 and Multop as measures of the shareholder structure of fund 
management companies. Table 10 illustrates that the Top1 is positively correlated 
with performance and market share. The results remain robust at the 10% level of 
significance (Table 10, Model 1 and 3) for both coefficients. This finding is consistent 
with that of with Gong et al (2016), as they find that the Top1 has a positive impact 
on fund performance By contrast, the presence of multiple large shareholders is 
negatively related to market share, performance and expense ratio, but is not 
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statistically significant. This result is not supported by Gong et al’s (2016) findings, as 
they claim that the presence of multiple large shareholders may reduce fund 
performance, as the decision–making process can be less efficient, resulting in an 
inferior performance.  
 
Table 11 reports the impact of supervisory boardsi on governance effectiveness. In 
China, the supervisory board serves as one of the two monitoring systems within the 
Chinese governance mechanism. According to the results displayed in the table, it 
can be seen that supervisory boards have a negative influence on market share. The 
result is robust at the 10% level of significance (Table 11, Model 1). This means that 
an increase in the membership of supervisory boards will reduce the market share of 
a fund management company. In addition, supervisory boards have no impact on 
performance and expense ratio. According to prior studies of public companies by 
Dahya et al (2003), Xi (2006), Firth et al (2007) and Ding et al (2010), the role of 
supervisory boards is complicated.  
 
Control variables 
 
In terms of the effect of the rest of the fund management company–specific control 
variables, the paper finds that larger fund management companies charge 
considerably lower fees, indicating the existence of economies of scale in the mutual 
fund industry. This result is consistent with the previous studies by Ferris and Yan 
(2007) and Cremers et al (2009). Additionally, an increase in fund management 
company size is found to decrease the raw return. This finding could be explained by 
the liquidity constraint hypothesis proposed by Chen et al (2004). However, in fact, 
the opposite relationship exists between company size and abnormal return. Fund 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  Supervisory board indicates the number of supervisors on the board of the fund management 
company and is also one of the characteristics of the German board system that has been recognised 
as among the most effective governance mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). According to 
China Company Law (1994), the function of the supervisory board is to monitor the financial affairs 
and manage the regulatory compliance of the board of directors and senior managers.  
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management company size also has a positive impact on market share. Finally, the 
dynamic panel models confirm the impacts of fund management company size on 
expense ratios, performance and market share. 
 
Turning now to the impact of the number of new funds started, the paper finds a 
negatively significant correlation between the number of new funds started and 
expense ratios. The detrimental impact of new funds on expense ratios could be 
caused by extra expenses involved in opening new funds or the dilution in 
management focus as a result of establishing new funds.  The number of funds is 
shown to have a positive impact on raw return in all the tables, but is only significant 
in the dynamic panel models. It is noteworthy that the relationship is negative in the 
case of abnormal return and market share. This result does not support the findings 
of Khorana and Servaes’ (2012) study, which suggests that a larger number of funds 
could positively affect market share. Furthermore, this paper also reports that the 
Herfindahl index across funds has a negative impact on expense ratios in the fixed 
effect models, while its influence on performance and market share is positive in all 
the corresponding models. Not surprisingly, the paper finds that performance also 
important for market share. Both performance measurements, that is, return and 
abnormal return, have a positive and significant impact in Table 6. This fining is 
consistent with study Khorana and Servaes (2012). However, expense ratios not 
matter for market share.  
 
Besides, the evidence on the impact of lagged performance is mixed in Table 8. 
More specifically, lagged return has a positive impact on performance at the 1% 
significance level in all corresponding models. On the contrast, lagged abnormal 
return has a negative impact on performance at the 1% significance level as well. 
The results of negative correlation will be the main finding. Therefore, the ‘winner’s 
repeat’ hypothesisj does not supported. The lagged expense ratio and market share, 
both have a positive and significant impact on expense ratio and market share 
respectively (Tables 9 and 10). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
j The ‘winner’s repeat’ hypothesis refers to fund managers have ability to obtain abnormal return 
persistently.  
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Robustness check 
 
This section presents the last robustness check in Tables 12 to 14. When the 
abnormal return and expense ratio are replaced by the objectivek adjusted returnl 
and the objective adjusted expense ratiom as a robustness exercise following the 
study Khorana and Servaes (2012), the results remain consistent with prior findings 
except for the relationship between managerial ownership and fund management 
companies’ performance is no longer statistically significant.  
 
<Insert Tables 12 to 14 about here> 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This paper uses a sample of Chinese mutual fund management companies from 
between 2005 and 2015 to explore whether fund investors’ interests are protected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  k The Following objective categories are used to calculate objective adjusted returns and expense 
ratio: Global equities, Asian equities, Emerging markets Equity, US equity, global index, global bonds 
and equities, specialty materials, long term bonds, short term bonds, hybrids bonds, income equities, 
growth equities, balanced equities, value investment equities, appreciation equities, indexes, stable 
growth equities, aggressive growth equities, money. 
l The calculation of objective adjusted return is to calculate the value of weighted average return for 
each investment objective, where the weight is the relative size of the fund within the objective. Then, 
return of each fund subtracts this weight average return in the fund company. Finally, it is to calculate 
the weight average of these objective adjusted returns across all funds within the fund management 
company. 
m The calculation is the same procedure used to calculate objective adjusted return. 
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under the unique governance structure by employing a fixed effect model and the 
two-step ‘system’ GMM model. Those interests include a fund management 
company’s expense ratio, performance and market share. This paper adopts two 
different measurements of a fund management company’s performance. The 
abnormal return is the main measurement of a fund’s performance.  
 
This paper reveals that having a larger number of directors on the board of the fund 
management company results in the company achieving a larger market share and 
finds weak evidence to support the contention that the board size of fund 
management companies positively affects performance regarding the extent of the 
raw return. In addition, having a greater percentage of independent directors in the 
fund management company means that the monitoring of management will be more 
efficient, resulting in a lower expense ratio and a higher market share. From the 
perspective of fund-holder composition, the paper finds that fund management 
companies with a higher level of managerial ownership perform better than fund 
management companies with a lower level of managerial ownership. In addition, a 
higher level of managerial ownership is also associated with a greater market share. 
Finally, this paper discovers that the presence of institutional investors reinforces the 
monitoring of fund management, which in turn brings superior fund management 
company performance. However, a higher level of institutional investor holding in a 
fund management company might contribute to a higher expense ratio. Most of 
these results are robust to the two-step ‘system’ GMM model. For the two–step 
‘system’ GMM model, this paper further reveals weak evidence that a fund 
management company with a larger board size might incur a higher expense ratio. 
Moreover, a higher level of managerial ownership might result in a lower expense 
ratio. It is also interesting to note that the empirical evidence observed for developed 
markets relating to fund management company characteristics, for instance, 
company assets, number of funds and number of funds started, also have an 
important influence on governance effectiveness in China.  
 
The findings of this paper offer potential regulatory improvement in the governance 
arrangements for the mutual fund industry. For instance, if regulators are concerned 
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about the fees charged to fund investors, the findings regarding the relationship 
between expense ratio and governance mechanisms show that a form of contractual 
governance with a smaller board size, a higher percentage of independent directors 
and a higher level of managerial ownership leads to improved governance 
effectiveness. In addition, this paper also highlights the importance of the 
relationship between governance effectiveness and institutional investors’ holding, 
as the presence of institutional investors are more powerful than individual fund 
investors in monitoring of fund operation.  
 
This paper has also examined the effect of the shareholder structure of fund 
management companies and the role of supervisory boards on governance 
effectiveness. The results show that a fund management company which only has 
one large shareholder will achieve a larger market share and better performance. In 
addition, a greater number of supervisory boards in the fund management company 
will lead to a smaller market share. Supervisory boards play a less effective role than 
independent directors under the existing contractual governance arrangements in 
China.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
 
 
Note: This table presents summary statistics the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and 
median values for the variables used in analyzing fund management company’s governance 
effectiveness from 2005 to 2015. Board size is the number of directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Managerial ownership is the percentage of ownership for board directors in a 
fund management company; The board structure will be represented by the number of independent 
directors; Portion of independents is the percentage of independent directors; Supervisory board size 
is the number of supervisors on the supervisory board of fund management company; Institutional 
investor hold is the percentage of share hold by institutional investors for each fund management 
company; Market share is the ratio of assets managed by the fund management company and all 
assets managed by the open-end mutual fund industry; Abnormal return is the difference between 
return of the fund management company and market return; Expense ratio is weighted average 
expense ratio computed across all the fund management company’s funds; Fund management 
company size is the log of total net assets managed by the fund management company; Number of 
objective per fund management company is total number of objectives in a fund management 
company in a given year; Number of funds per fund management company is the total number of 
funds in a fund management company in a given year; Herfindahl index across funds is the sum of 
the squared fraction of each fund’s share of total fund management company assets; Number of 
funds started is total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year.  
 
 
Variables Mean SD MIN MAX Median
Board4size 8.68 1.57 5 13 9
Supervisory4Board4size 3.68 1.37 0 8 3
Board4structure 3.32 0.58 0 6 3
Portion4of4Independents4(%) 38.72 5.98 0 60 37.5
Managerial4ownership(%) 0.07 0.26 0 3.94 0.02
Institutional4Investor4Hold4(%) 69.13 22.81 0.36 100 74.53
Expense4ratio(%) 1.87 1.13 0.009 10.17 1.76
Abnormal4retrun(%) S4.95 24.56 S115.75 65.57 1.3
Market4share4(%) 1.46 1.83 0.0002 15.15 0.75
Company4Size4(in4billions) 36 62.4 0.012 684 15.2
No.4of4Objective4per4company 5.77 3.43 1 16 6
No.4of4funds4per4company 12.2 13.29 1 83 7
Herfindahl4index4across4funds 3990.12 2995.3 509.11 21362.8 2968.3
No.4of4funds4started 3.34 4.23 0 34 2
Panel4A4(1):4Governance4Variables4
Panel4B:4Governance4Effectiveness
Panel4C:4Fund4company4S4specific4varaibles
Panel4A4(2):4External4Governance4variable
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Table 2. Fund management company’s market share over time 
 
Note: This table shows the evolution of fund management company market share over the 2005 – 
2015 period. NoC is the number of fund management company. MS is the market share of fund 
management company. MS of top 3 is the market share of top three fund management companies is 
the proportion of assets managed by the three largest mutual fund management companies in a given 
year. MS of top 5 is the market share of top five fund management companies is the proportion of 
assets managed by the five largest mutual fund management companies in a given year. MS of top 
10 is the market share of top ten fund management companies is the proportion of assets managed 
by the ten largest mutual fund management companies in a given year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year NoC MS*(%) MS*top*3(%) MS*top*5(%) MS*top*10(%)
2005 47 1.55 25.34 33.77 46.08
2006 52 1.92 22.36 35.95 61.76
2007 57 1.75 19.52 29.23 47.41
2008 59 1.69 21.45 30.14 49.00
2009 60 1.67 19.11 28.08 46.53
2010 60 1.67 20.44 29.13 45.85
2011 64 1.56 19.52 29.20 46.77
2012 70 1.43 20.64 30.83 48.79
2013 77 1.30 19.55 29.75 48.37
2014 92 1.09 28.16 38.63 53.13
2015 101 1.06 22.76 31.66 49.68
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients for independent variables from 2005 to 2015. The variable 
with an asterisk (*) is measured in logarithmic; Independent variables with high correlation coefficients 
are marked boldface; Board size is the number of directors on the board of the fund management 
company. Managerial ownership is the percentage of ownership for board directors in a fund 
management company. Board structure is the percentage of independent directors. IIHold is the 
percentage of share hold by institutional investors for each fund management company. Market share 
is the ratio of assets managed by the fund management company and all assets managed by the 
open-end mutual fund industry. Abreturn is the difference between return of the fund management 
company and market return. Expense ratio is weighted average expense ratio computed across all 
the fund management company’s funds. Company size is the log of total net assets managed by the 
fund management company. Number of funds per fund management company is the total number of 
funds in a fund management company in a given year. Herfindahl index across funds is the sum of 
the squared fraction of each fund’s share of total fund management company assets. Number of 
funds started is total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1+Board1size 1
2+Board1structure +0.41 1
3+IIHold 0.02 +0.05 1
5+Ownership +0.02 +0.08 +0.03 1
5+No.funds 0.09 +0.06 +0.18 +0.1 1
6+No.funds1started 0.06 +0.08 +0.26 +0.06 0.85 1
7+Herfindahl +0.1 0.06 +0.06 0.19 +0.54 +0.37 1
8+Market1share 0.03 +0.02 0.11 +0.13 0.36 0.33 +0.28 1
9+Abreturn 0.02 +0.04 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.11 +0.14 +0.02 1
10+Expense 0.01 +0.04 0.41 0.1 +0.18 +0.21 0.05 +0.22 0.13 1
11+Company1size* 0.07 +0.02 0.09 +0.31 0.63 0.51 +0.6 0.62 0.13 +0.2 1
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Table 4: Fixed effect regressions for Fund Management Company Expense Ratio 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance on 
expense ratio for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s expense 
ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the board of the 
fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; IIHold is the 
percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of 
fund management company asset; Return is the raw return of the fund management company; Abnormal return 
is computed as the difference between return of the fund management company and market return; No. of funds 
started is total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Market share is 
calculated by the sum of all assets under management by each company divided by all assets under 
management in the fund industry; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the 
company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy 
variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance 
at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7 Model'8
Log(company'assets) @0.179 @0.193* @0.158 @0.157 @0.154 @0.165 @0.164 @0.173
(0.123) (0.114) (0.121) (0.107) (0.123) (0.115) (0.116) (0.109)
Return @0.00831*** @0.0134*** @0.00788*** @0.00727***
(0.00267) (0.00244) (0.00266) (0.00269)
Abnormal'return 0.00370 0.00656** 0.00328 0.00278
(0.00273) (0.00252) (0.00284) (0.00273)
No.'of'funds'started @0.00860 @0.00642 @0.0224*** @0.0294*** @0.0106 @0.00895 0.00945 0.0120*
(0.00836) (0.00832) (0.00850) (0.00837) (0.00842) (0.00825) (0.00633) (0.00664)
Market'share @0.0507 @0.0478 @0.0470 @0.0438 @0.0592 @0.0568 @0.0780 @0.0774
(0.0497) (0.0472) (0.0499) (0.0460) (0.0490) (0.0469) (0.0504) (0.0489)
Herfindahl'index @0.883 @0.99 @0.716 @0.792 @0.857 @0.956 @0.686 @0.766
(0.71) (0.673) (0.696) (0.619) (0.708) (0.674) (0.676) (0.643)
Board'size 0.00875 @0.00462
(0.0508) (0.0532)
Board'structure @0.0176* @0.0164*
(0.00896) (0.00986)
Ownership 0.508 0.546
(0.634) (0.617)
IIHold 0.0130*** 0.0136***
(0.00356) (0.00346)
Constant 6.311** 6.709** 6.678** 6.603** 5.794* 5.988** 5.098* 5.213*
(3.023) (2.827) (3.056) (2.691) (3.043) (2.822) (3.043) (2.855)
Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731
R@squared 0.246 0.217 0.196 0.089 0.260 0.232 0.296 0.272
Expense'ratio
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Table 5: Fixed effect regressions for Fund Management Company Performance 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance on 
performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s raw return and 
abnormal return. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; 
IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) 
is the log of fund management company asset; No. of funds is total number of funds in a fund management 
company in a given year; Market share is calculated by the sum of all assets under management by each 
company divided by all assets under management in the fund industry; Log (age) is the number of years for a 
fund management company exists in the industry; Expense is the fund management company’s expense ratio; 
Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; 
the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, 
for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 
5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7 Model'8
Log(company'assets) @6.565*** @6.622*** @6.881*** @6.505*** 5.352*** 5.351*** 5.720*** 5.296***
(1.535) (1.558) (1.589) (1.568) (1.903) (1.915) (1.864) (1.876)
No.'of'funds' 7.763*** 7.845*** 8.138*** 7.640*** 2.742 2.712 2.391 3.342
(2.446) (2.436) (2.468) (2.495) (2.252) (2.248) (2.266) (2.194)
Expense @6.476*** @6.534*** @6.283*** @6.285*** 2.495 2.509 2.278 1.824
(1.810) (1.815) (1.849) (1.904) (2.098) (2.102) (2.179) (2.227)
Market'share 1.818* 1.754* 1.825* 1.765* @2.726*** @2.685*** @2.819*** @2.919***
(1.056) (1.048) (1.030) (1.022) (0.937) (0.948) (0.941) (1.018)
Herfindahl'index 11.4 11.5 11.8 11 11.7 11.6 11.4 13.7*
(8.49) (8.51) (8.27) (8.73) (7.88) (7.90) (8.05) (7.78)
Board'size 1.686* @0.676
(0.883) (0.783)
Board'structure @0.213 0.0359
(0.233) (0.216)
Ownership @6.513 6.912*
(6.367) (3.937)
IIHold @0.0350 0.113**
(0.0460) (0.0567)
Constant 134.9*** 159.2*** 156.1*** 150.7*** @132.0*** @139.3*** @145.5*** @144.5***
(34.70) (36.34) (34.46) (34.40) (41.65) (45.08) (40.91) (42.39)
Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731
R@squared 0.661 0.660 0.661 0.660 0.203 0.203 0.206 0.208
Performance'@'Return Performance'@'Abnormal'return
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Table 6: Fixed effect regressions for Fund Management Company Market Share 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance on 
market share for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market share. 
For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; IIHold is the 
percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of 
fund management company asset; Return is the fund management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total 
number of funds in a fund management company in a given year; Return is the raw return of the fund 
management company; Abnormal return is computed as the difference between return of the fund management 
company and market return; Expense is the fund management company’s expense ratio; Herfindahl index is 
computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis 
period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the 
year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7 Model'8
Log(company'assets) 0.838*** 0.835*** 0.848*** 0.845*** 0.857*** 0.854*** 0.828*** 0.825***
(0.221) (0.224) (0.220) (0.223) (0.222) (0.225) (0.206) (0.208)
No.'of'funds F0.825*** F0.785*** F0.831*** F0.792*** F0.848*** F0.808*** F0.789*** F0.746***
(0.172) (0.165) (0.174) (0.166) (0.177) (0.170) (0.167) (0.161)
Return 0.00309* 0.00297* 0.00311* 0.00297*
(0.00160) (0.00162) (0.00161) (0.00159)
Abnormal'return F0.00405* F0.00399* F0.00420* F0.00433*
(0.00218) (0.00219) (0.00221) (0.00231)
Expense 0.0375 0.0275 0.0432 0.0337 0.0267 0.0167 F0.000576 F0.0112
(0.0403) (0.0374) (0.0417) (0.0387) (0.0426) (0.0399) (0.0511) (0.0493)
Herfindahl'index 0.376 0.456 0.38 0.458 0.347 0.429 0.477 0.565
(0.645) (0.64) (0.646) (0.641) (0.632) (0.628) (0.679) (0.676)
Board'size F0.116** F0.113**
(0.0559) (0.0552)
Board'structure 0.0284* 0.0277*
(0.0164) (0.0164)
Ownership 0.378** 0.384**
(0.156) (0.171)
IIHold 0.00644 0.00678
(0.00418) (0.00430)
Constant F15.37*** F15.41*** F17.72*** F17.70*** F16.76*** F16.79*** F16.61*** F16.67***
(5.183) (5.273) (5.041) (5.132) (5.077) (5.168) (4.950) (5.037)
Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731
RFsquared 0.282 0.286 0.281 0.285 0.281 0.286 0.285 0.291
Market'share
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Table 7: Dynamic panel regressions for Fund Management Company Expense Ratio 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance 
on expense ratio for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s expense 
ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the board of the 
fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; L.expense ratio is 
the one year lagged of the fund management company’s expense ratio; IIHold is the percentage of institutional 
investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management 
company asset; Return is the raw return of the fund management company; Abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between return of the fund management company and market return; No. of funds started is total 
number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Market share is calculated by the 
sum of all assets under management by each company divided by all assets under management in the fund 
industry; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in 
each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported 
in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 
otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** 
significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7 Model'8
L.expense'ratio 0.278*** 0.205** >0.0863* >0.254*** 0.273*** 0.227** 0.211*** 0.164**
(0.0454) (0.0882) (0.0507) (0.0554) (0.0406) (0.0872) (0.0424) (0.0711)
Log(company'assets) >0.111 >0.0658 >0.496*** >0.598*** >0.0637 >0.292** >0.0890 >0.156
(0.0757) (0.0816) (0.112) (0.145) (0.0984) (0.132) (0.101) (0.112)
Return >0.0123*** >0.0298*** >0.0124*** >0.0119***
(0.00188) (0.00377) (0.00322) (0.00222)
Abnormal'return 0.00856*** 0.0266*** 0.00418 0.000518
(0.00220) (0.00419) (0.00410) (0.00401)
No.'of'funds'started >0.0143 >0.0165* 0.0356** 0.0214 >0.0229 3.55e>05 >0.000625 0.0293***
(0.0103) (0.00947) (0.0154) (0.0174) (0.0147) (0.0136) (0.0127) (0.0100)
Market'share 0.0417 >0.126** >0.0286 0.0790 0.00476 0.0130 >0.0396 >0.178***
(0.0597) (0.0605) (0.0816) (0.0624) (0.0629) (0.0565) (0.0549) (0.0649)
Herfindahl'index 0.682 0.388 0.179 >0.497 0.889 >0.882 0.648 >0.477
(0.481) (0.612) (0.981) (1.111) (0.744) (0.866) (0.65) (0.744)
Board'size 0.0440 >0.0819
(0.0730) (0.123)
Board'structure >0.0488* >0.0337*
(0.0264) (0.0171)
Ownership 0.543 0.0300
(0.993) (0.859)
IIHold 0.00672** 0.0241***
(0.00333) (0.00412)
Constant 3.503* 3.857* 15.69*** 17.66*** 2.735 8.500*** 3.088 3.874
(2.061) (2.217) (3.366) (3.795) (2.394) (3.161) (2.487) (2.956)
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
AR(2) 0.13 0.289 0.101 0.173 0.158 0.174 0.135 0.275
Hansen'p'value 0.773 0.149 0.132 0.196 0.364 0.194 0.474 0.22
Expense'ratio
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Table 8: Dynamic panel regressions for Fund Management Company Performance 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance 
on performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s 
performance. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; 
L.performance is the one year lagged estimate of the performance variable and is used to measure fund 
management company performance persistence under each model; IIHold is the percentage of institutional 
investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management 
company asset; Return is the fund management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total number of funds in a 
fund management company in a given year; Market share is calculated by the sum of all assets under 
management by each company divided by all assets under management in the fund industry; Log (age) is the 
number of years for a fund management company exists in the industry; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum 
of the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 
2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which 
takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are 
corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 
1% level.  
 
 
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7 Model'8
L.performance 0.186*** 0.115*** 0.179*** 0.217*** @0.151*** @0.366*** @0.122*** @0.185***
(0.0559) (0.0403) (0.0499) (0.0562) (0.0395) (0.0594) (0.0424) (0.0432)
Log(company'assets) @24.42*** @19.53*** @26.86*** @26.54*** 15.27*** 11.01*** 20.39*** 15.99***
(4.406) (4.146) (4.310) (4.757) (3.202) (3.467) (3.402) (3.044)
No.'of'funds' 25.47*** 21.02*** 27.86*** 28.56*** @5.119 @0.351 @11.23*** @5.646
(6.156) (5.711) (5.866) (5.948) (3.667) (3.870) (4.110) (3.602)
Expense @24.79*** @14.27*** @21.80*** @24.07*** 13.94*** 7.178** 15.02*** 9.474***
(3.270) (2.408) (3.479) (5.173) (2.705) (3.045) (2.906) (3.140)
Market'share 7.099*** 8.550*** 7.054*** 9.553*** @6.550*** @6.953*** @6.263*** @8.970***
(2.411) (2.890) (2.484) (2.722) (1.581) (1.861) (1.390) (1.761)
Herfindahl'index 33.9** 32.6*** 30.3** 28.4* @1.62 2.67 1.01 8.86
(15.6) (11.1) (14.9) (17.2) (9.13) (11.7) (9.52) (7.78)
Board'size 8.077** @7.795***
(3.724) (2.644)
Board'structure @0.423 0.167
(0.439) (0.358)
Ownership @115.5** 96.88***
(45.56) (29.21)
IIHold @0.0112 0.272***
(0.131) (0.0830)
Constant 474.2*** 437.4*** 597.4*** 583.8*** @296.3*** @271.1*** @477.9*** @388.9***
(107.5) (89.31) (93.68) (103.3) (72.41) (80.22) (73.03) (65.47)
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
AR(2) 0.534 0.549 0.941 0.772 0.33 0.12 0.473 0.55
Hansen'p'value 0.626 0.599 0.452 0.498 0.602 0.573 0.556 0.633
Performance'@'Return Performance'@'Abnormal'return
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Table 9: Dynamic panel regressions for Fund Management Company Market Share 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance 
on market share for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market 
share. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the board of 
the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the board of the 
fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; L.market share 
is the one year lagged of market share; IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund 
management company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management company asset; Return is the fund 
management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total number of funds in a fund management company in a 
given year; Return is the raw return of the fund management company; Abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between return of the fund management company and market return; Expense is the fund 
management company’s expense ratio; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the 
company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy 
variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance 
at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7 Model'8
L.market'share 0.402*** 0.494*** 0.435*** 0.443*** 0.485*** 0.458*** 0.454*** 0.447***
(0.0684) (0.0863) (0.0928) (0.0853) (0.0944) (0.0828) (0.0840) (0.0968)
Log(company'assets) 0.690*** 0.669*** 0.685*** 0.638*** 0.900*** 0.869*** 0.657*** 0.662***
(0.111) (0.182) (0.192) (0.183) (0.185) (0.162) (0.129) (0.143)
No.'of'funds I0.822*** I0.818*** I0.791*** I0.775*** I1.043*** I0.961*** I0.703*** I0.693***
(0.169) (0.211) (0.224) (0.196) (0.213) (0.203) (0.167) (0.166)
Return 0.00861*** 0.00400 0.00925* 0.00543
(0.00302) (0.00489) (0.00473) (0.00356)
Abnormal'return 4.15eI05 0.00177 I0.00375** I0.00228
(0.00323) (0.00315) (0.00185) (0.00318)
Expense 0.0693 I0.180** I0.121 I0.207** 0.0448 I0.00488 I0.291** I0.345***
(0.0765) (0.0902) (0.134) (0.0834) (0.102) (0.0630) (0.114) (0.109)
Herfindahl'index 0.213 0.665 0.488 0.785 0.239 0.886** 0.607 0.760*
(0.308) (0.433) (0.442) (0.485) (0.374) (0.421) (0.368) (0.387)
Board'size I0.117* I0.0400
(0.0696) (0.0854)
Board'structure 0.0581*** 0.0550**
(0.0220) (0.0218)
Ownership 2.414** 1.683**
(1.112) (0.719)
IIHold 0.0130*** 0.0132***
(0.00265) (0.00398)
Constant I12.63*** I12.50*** I15.58*** I14.29*** I18.22*** I17.61*** I13.48*** I13.54***
(2.317) (3.576) (4.464) (4.341) (4.081) (3.435) (2.777) (3.158)
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
AR(2) 0.239 0.245 0.247 0.235 0.235 0.239 0.279 0.265
Hansen'pIvalue 0.614 0.262 0.387 0.284 0.208 0.21 0.287 0.284
Market'share
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Table 10: The impact of shareholder structure on governance effectiveness  
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the shareholder structure on governance 
effectiveness for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market share, 
abnormal return and expense ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts Top1: it is the largest 
shareholder’s holding; Multop is a dummy variable if the fund management company has more than one largest 
shareholder and zero otherwise; IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management 
company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management company asset; Return is the fund management 
company’s raw return; No. of funds is total number of funds in a fund management company in a given year; 
Return is the raw return of the fund management company; Abnormal return is computed as the difference 
between return of the fund management company and market return; Expense is the fund management 
company’s expense ratio; Company top 5 is a dummy equal to 1 if the company has a fund that is performing in 
the top 5% of all funds in its investment objectives; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  
year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if 
the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, 
*significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
Dependent'varaibls
Model' Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6
Top1 0.0176* 0.212* 0.00646
(0.0104) (0.117) (0.00619)
Multop @0.348 @3.340 @0.100
(0.220) (3.617) (0.145)
Expense @0.0934* @0.0893 3.756* 3.814*
(0.0536) (0.0547) (1.994) (2.014)
Abnormal'return @0.00208 @0.00194 0.00518** 0.00525**
(0.00153) (0.00152) (0.00239) (0.00241)
No.of'funds @0.442*** @0.449***
(0.0995) (0.104)
Log(company'assets) 0.520*** 0.534*** 3.572*** 3.707*** 0.0211 0.0250
(0.135) (0.136) (0.917) (0.922) (0.0500) (0.0496)
Company'top'5 @0.135* @0.118 @4.584** @4.388** 0.0351 0.0414
(0.0684) (0.0720) (2.222) (2.180) (0.0747) (0.0754)
Market'share @2.203*** @2.104*** @0.111*** @0.108***
(0.784) (0.769) (0.0259) (0.0286)
No'of'funds'started 7.008** 6.840** @0.618*** @0.625***
(3.053) (3.046) (0.0994) (0.102)
Constant @10.38*** @9.595*** @103.2*** @93.66*** 1.456 1.755
(2.954) (2.838) (20.26) (20.08) (1.096) (1.117)
Observations 731 731 731 731 731 731
R@squared 0.217 0.211 0.077 0.075 0.071 0.070
Market'share Abnormal'return Expense'ratio
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Table 11: The impact of supervisory boards on governance effectiveness  
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the supervisory boards on governance 
effectiveness for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market share, 
abnormal return and expense ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts supervisory boards: it is the 
number of supervisors on the board of the fund management company; IIHold is the percentage of institutional 
investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management 
company asset; Return is the fund management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total number of funds in a 
fund management company in a given year; Return is the raw return of the fund management company; 
Abnormal return is computed as the difference between return of the fund management company and market 
return; Expense is the fund management company’s expense ratio; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of 
the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 
is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes 
the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected 
standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'variables Market'share Abnormal'return Expense
Board'of'supervison :0.140* :0.257 0.0298
(0.0717) (1.344) (0.0575)
Log(company'assets) 0.833*** 5.335*** :0.198*
(0.222) (1.887) (0.115)
No.'of'funds :0.736*** 2.813
(0.167) (2.327)
Abnormal'return :0.00400* 0.00370
(0.00218) (0.00273)
Expense 0.0249 2.496
(0.0387) (2.104)
Herfindahl'index 0.495 11.7 :0.99
(0.641) (7.85) (0.672)
Market'share :2.690*** :0.0445
(0.943) (0.0477)
No.'of'funds'started :0.00733
(0.00815)
Constant :15.93*** :136.8*** 6.663**
(5.108) (42.26) (2.795)
Observations 731 731 731
R:squared 0.285 0.203 0.217
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Table 12: Fixed effect regressions for Fund Management Company Expense Ratio 
(Robustness check) 
 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance on 
expense ratio for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s objective 
adjusted expense ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors 
on the board of the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on 
the board of the fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board 
ownership; IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; 
Log(company assets) is the log of fund management company asset; Adreturn is the objective adjusted return; 
No. of funds started is total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Market 
share is calculated by the sum of all assets under management by each company divided by all assets under 
management in the fund industry; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the 
company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy 
variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance 
at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4
Log(family'assets) <0.238*** <0.243*** <0.247*** <0.234***
(0.0422) (0.0430) (0.0441) (0.0396)
Ad<return <0.00487** <0.00497** <0.00495** <0.00492**
(0.00202) (0.00203) (0.00197) (0.00201)
No.'of'funds'started 0.00374 0.00332 0.00458 0.00925
(0.00662) (0.00653) (0.00662) (0.00713)
Market'share 0.0725*** 0.0765*** 0.0753*** 0.0645***
(0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0197)
Herfindahl'index <0.560*** <0.568*** <0.572*** <0.496***
(0.166) (0.165) (0.169) (0.151)
Board'size 0.00228
(0.0719)
Board'structure <0.0137*
(0.00761)
Ownership <0.193
(0.334)
IIHold 0.00402**
(0.00183)
Constant 5.285*** 5.942*** 5.511*** 4.905***
(1.020) (1.127) (1.037) (0.911)
Observations 731 731 731 731
R<squared 0.185 0.189 0.189 0.196
Ad'<'Expense'ratio
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Table 13: Fixed effect regressions for Fund Management Company Performance 
(Robustness check) 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance on 
performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s objective 
adjusted return. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; 
IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) 
is the log of fund management company asset; Market share is calculated by the sum of all assets under 
management by each company divided by all assets under management in the fund industry; AdExpense is the 
fund management company’s objective adjusted expense ratio; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the 
squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a 
series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the 
value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected 
standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4
Log(family'assets) <1.166 <1.239 <1.355 <1.125
(0.865) (0.860) (0.893) (0.862)
No.'of'funds' 2.567** 2.571** 2.738** 2.645**
(1.191) (1.175) (1.201) (1.208)
Ad<Expense <2.464** <2.509** <2.533** <2.546**
(1.016) (1.020) (0.993) (1.026)
Market'share 0.371 0.413 0.423 0.312
(0.439) (0.435) (0.441) (0.420)
Herfindahl'index 2.64 2.55 2.67 3.19
(2.67) (2.65) (2.65) (2.81)
Board'size 0.0849
(0.492)
Board'structure <0.149
(0.104)
Ownership <2.396
(2.532)
IIHold 0.0269
(0.0236)
Constant 17.66 25.79 22.47 15.41
(17.71) (19.11) (18.66) (18.19)
Observations 731 731 731 731
R<squared 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.051
Performance'<'Ad<return
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Table 14: Fixed effect regressions for Fund Management Company Market Share 
(Robustness check) 
 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance on 
market share for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market share. 
For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the board of the fund 
management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; IIHold is the 
percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of 
fund management company asset; Return is the fund management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total 
number of funds in a fund management company in a given year; Ad-Return is the raw return of the fund 
management company; Abnormal return is computed as the difference between return of the fund management 
company and market return; Ad-Expense is the fund management company’s expense ratio; Herfindahl index is 
computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis 
period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the 
year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** 
significance at the 1% level.  
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4
Log(family'assets) 0.877*** 0.886*** 0.904*** 0.876***
(0.231) (0.230) (0.233) (0.223)
No.'of'funds E0.827*** E0.830*** E0.859*** E0.814***
(0.170) (0.172) (0.176) (0.169)
'AdEreturn 0.00198 0.00220 0.00225 0.00166
(0.00254) (0.00253) (0.00258) (0.00237)
AdEExpense 0.251*** 0.251** 0.254** 0.222***
(0.0947) (0.0957) (0.0974) (0.0839)
Herfindahl'index 0.482 0.482 0.456 0.561
(0.635) (0.635) (0.624) (0.672)
Board'size E0.122**
(0.0522)
Board'structure 0.0304**
(0.0151)
Ownership 0.413**
(0.177)
IIHold 0.00514
(0.00350)
Constant E16.09*** E18.52*** E17.71*** E17.53***
(5.341) (5.256) (5.295) (5.267)
Observations 731 731 731 731
REsquared 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.295
Market'share
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Table 15:  Dynamic panel regressions for the impact of shareholder structure on governance 
effectiveness  
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the shareholder structure on 
governance effectiveness for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s 
market share, abnormal return and expense ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts Top1: it is the 
largest shareholder’s holding; Multop is a dummy variable if the fund management company has more than one 
largest shareholder and zero otherwise; IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund 
management company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management company asset; Return is the fund 
management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total number of funds in a fund management company in a 
given year; Return is the raw return of the fund management company; Abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between return of the fund management company and market return; Expense is the fund 
management company’s expense ratio; Company top 5 is a dummy equal to 1 if the company has a fund that is 
performing in the top 5% of all funds in its investment objectives; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a 
series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the 
value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected 
standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
Dependent'varaibls
Model' Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6
L.dependent 0.573*** 0.600*** <0.106* <0.143* 0.184*** 0.191***
(0.161) (0.153) (0.0629) (0.0757) (0.0674) (0.0604)
Top1 0.0186* 0.649** 0.00280
(0.0106) (0.247) (0.00978)
Multop <0.648 <23.32** <0.288
(0.611) (8.926) (0.362)
Log(company'assets) 0.119 0.160 9.131*** 8.822*** <0.0549 <0.0507
(0.0879) (0.110) (1.938) (2.102) (0.0755) (0.0699)
No.of'funds <0.213** <0.245**
(0.0885) (0.1000)
Expense <0.0411 <0.0637 14.03*** 16.39***
(0.0619) (0.0567) (2.764) (3.588)
Market'share <4.976** <4.662** <0.193** <0.197***
(2.258) (2.121) (0.0735) (0.0684)
Company'top'5 0.0284 0.0561 <2.546 <1.882 0.0642 0.0627
(0.0668) (0.0669) (2.493) (2.309) (0.0718) (0.0765)
Abnormal'return 0.00112 0.000599 0.00637** 0.00653**
(0.00281) (0.00258) (0.00312) (0.00311)
No'of'funds'started 15.17*** 16.52*** <0.904*** <0.952***
(5.156) (5.584) (0.172) (0.149)
Constant <2.583 <2.110 <276.2*** <226.5*** 3.372* 3.626**
(2.083) (2.523) (48.17) (50.36) (1.795) (1.652)
Observations 636 636 636 636 636 636
AR'(2) 0.356 0.32 0.203 0.514 0.17 0.178
Hansen'p'value 0.489 0.67 0.335 0.206 0.304 0.315
Market'share Abnormal'return Expense'ratio
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Table 16: Dynamic panel regressions for the impact of supervisory boards on governance 
effectiveness  
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the supervisory boards on governance 
effectiveness for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market share, 
abnormal return and expense ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts supervisory boards: it is the 
number of supervisors on the board of the fund management company; IIHold is the percentage of institutional 
investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of fund management 
company asset; Return is the fund management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total number of funds in a 
fund management company in a given year; Return is the raw return of the fund management company; 
Abnormal return is computed as the difference between return of the fund management company and market 
return; Expense is the fund management company’s expense ratio; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of 
the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 
is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes 
the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected 
standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
Dependent'variables Market'share Abnormal'return Expense
L.dependent 0.594*** ?0.370*** 0.262***
(0.102) (0.0577) (0.0770)
Board'of'supervison ?0.0893 ?2.011 0.0367
(0.104) (1.679) (0.0792)
Log(company'assets) 0.482*** 6.635 ?0.245**
(0.129) (4.182) (0.107)
No.'of'funds ?0.533*** 5.081
(0.142) (5.634)
Abnormal'return ?0.000638 0.00335
(0.00206) (0.00371)
Expense ?0.129* 5.601**
(0.0682) (2.698)
Herfindahl'index 0.717* ?6.71 ?0.894
(0.367) (16.1) (0.828)
Market'share ?1.574 ?0.00901
(1.850) (0.0585)
No.'of'funds'started ?0.180
(0.148)
Constant ?9.048*** ?170.2* 7.293***
(2.671) (89.08) (2.550)
Observations 636 636 636
AR'(2) 0.296 0.181 0.219
Hansen'p'value 0.133 0.271 0.256
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Table 17: Dynamic panel regressions for Fund Management Company Expense Ratio 
(Robustness check) 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance 
on expense ratio for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s objective 
adjusted expense ratio. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors 
on the board of the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on 
the board of the fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board 
ownership; IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; 
Log(company assets) is the log of fund management company asset; Adreturn is the objective adjusted return; 
No. of funds started is total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year; Market 
share is calculated by the sum of all assets under management by each company divided by all assets under 
management in the fund industry; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the 
company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy 
variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance 
at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level. 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4
L.expense'ratio 0.165*** 0.222*** 0.151*** 0.129***
(0.0485) (0.0475) (0.0510) (0.0417)
Log(family'assets) E0.261*** E0.140* E0.274*** E0.265***
(0.0704) (0.0723) (0.0694) (0.0563)
AdEreturn E0.00585 E0.00860 0.00100 0.00340
(0.0100) (0.00836) (0.00923) (0.00908)
No.'of'funds'started 0.0114 E0.00268 0.0140* 0.0291***
(0.00890) (0.00805) (0.00781) (0.00842)
Market'share 0.0636 0.0946** 0.0560 0.0200
(0.0409) (0.0435) (0.0385) (0.0383)
Herfindahl'index E0.448* 0.101 E0.510** E0.409*
(0.226) (0.273) (0.252) (0.213)
Board'size 0.135*
(0.0756)
Board'structure E0.0358**
(0.0165)
Ownership E0.545
(0.844)
IIHold 0.00762***
(0.00194)
Constant 4.694*** 4.268** 6.224*** 5.433***
(1.591) (2.005) (1.629) (1.305)
Observations 636 636 636 636
AR(2) 0.432 0.887 0.486 0.428
Hansen'p'value 0.265 0.443 0.179 0.405
Ad'E'Expense'ratio
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Table 18: Dynamic panel regressions for Fund Management Company Performance 
(Robustness check) 
 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance 
on performance for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s objective 
adjusted return. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board of the fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; 
IIHold is the percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) 
is the log of fund management company asset; Market share is calculated by the sum of all assets under 
management by each company divided by all assets under management in the fund industry; AdExpense is the 
fund management company’s objective adjusted expense ratio; Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the 
squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a 
series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the 
value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected 
standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4
L.performance 90.152* 90.156*** 90.261** 90.216*
(0.0900) (0.0593) (0.127) (0.125)
Log(family'assets) 92.026 93.188* 94.209** 93.500**
(1.314) (1.811) (1.977) (1.681)
No.'of'funds' 3.697** 3.932 5.879** 6.426***
(1.836) (2.487) (2.593) (2.146)
Ad9Expense 93.806** 95.267*** 92.677* 94.419***
(1.649) (1.599) (1.443) (1.535)
Market'share 0.164 0.493 0.838 90.246
(0.766) (0.906) (1.075) (1.287)
Herfindahl'index 7.45 5.8 5.29 3.14
(6.35) (5.38) (5.42) (5.91)
Board'size 2.409**
(1.166)
Board'structure 90.366
(0.290)
Ownership 945.07*
(23.14)
IIHold 0.109***
(0.0393)
Constant 13.52 75.09* 82.65** 57.13
(30.01) (40.67) (39.39) (34.81)
Observations 636 636 636 636
AR(2) 0.315 0.235 0.119 0.197
Hansen'p'value 0.367 0.429 0.372 0.369
Performance'9'Ad9return
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Table 19: Dynamic panel regressions for Fund Management Company Market Share 
(Robustness check) 
 
Note: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the contractual mutual fund governance 
on market share for the period 2005 to 2015. The dependent variable is fund management company’s market 
share. For the independent variables the paper adopts board size: it is the number of directors on the board of 
the fund management company; Board structure is the percentage of independent directors on the board of the 
fund management company; Ownership is including managerial ownership and board ownership; IIHold is the 
percentage of institutional investors holding in a fund management company; Log(company assets) is the log of 
fund management company asset; Return is the fund management company’s raw return; No. of funds is total 
number of funds in a fund management company in a given year; Ad-Return is the raw return of the fund 
management company; Abnormal return is computed as the difference between return of the fund management 
company and market return; Ad-Expense is the fund management company’s expense ratio; Herfindahl index is 
computed as the sum of the squared fractions of the company’s assets invested in each fund; the financial crisis 
period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the 
year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the 
parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** 
significance at the 1% level. 
Dependent'variable
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4
L.market'share 0.485*** 0.441*** 0.476*** 0.447***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.0956) (0.0971)
Log(family'assets) 0.788*** 0.801*** 0.898*** 0.797***
(0.126) (0.164) (0.175) (0.114)
No.'of'funds H0.987*** H0.971*** H1.093*** H0.937***
(0.206) (0.210) (0.225) (0.185)
'AdHreturn 0.00894 0.0124 0.0165 0.00719
(0.00914) (0.0145) (0.0120) (0.0106)
AdHExpense H0.0601 H0.109 H0.0379 H0.225
(0.226) (0.240) (0.227) (0.192)
Herfindahl'index 0.629 0.811 0.731 0.848*
(0.48) (0.499) (0.523) (0.485)
Board'size H0.0125
(0.0835)
Board'structure 0.0470**
(0.0229)
Ownership 1.872*
(1.054)
IIHold 0.00871***
(0.00275)
Constant H15.46*** H17.70*** H17.98*** H16.49***
(2.610) (3.828) (3.739) (2.454)
Observations 636 636 636 636
AR(2) 0.227 0.2 0.204 0.2
Hansen'p'value 0.272 0.256 0.129 0.233
Market'share
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Appendix 1 
 
Variables definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board&size The number of directors on the board of the fund management company
Supervisory&Board&size The number of supervisors on the supervisory board of fund management company
Board&structure The number of independent directors
Portion&of&Independents The percentage of independent directors
Managerial&ownership The percentage of ownership for board directors in a fund management company
Institutional&Investor&Hold The percentage of share hold by institutional investors for each fund management company
Expense&ratio Weighted average expense ratio computed across all the fund management company’s funds
Return Weighted average raw return computed across all the fund management company’s funds
Abnormal&retrun The difference between return of the fund management company and market return
Market&share The ratio of assets managed by the fund management company and all assets managed by the open-end mutual fund industry
Company&Size& The log of total net assets managed by the fund management company
No.&of&Objective The total number of objectives in a fund management company in a given year
No.&of&funds The total number of funds in a fund management company in a given year
Herfindahl&index& The sum of the squared fraction of each fund’s share of total fund management company assets
No.&of&funds&started The total number of new funds started by a fund management company in a given year
Top&1 The largest shareholder’s holding
Multop A dummy variable if the fund management company has more than one largest shareholder and zero otherwise
